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Governments matter for capitalist economies: 
Regeneration and transition to green and decent 
jobs 
 
Introduction 
 
For many governments, the transition to a Ǯgreen economyǯ presents opportunities to identify new 
avenues of growth demanded by the global financial 
crisis, as well as address environmental concerns. In 
particular, there have been efforts to Ǯgreenǯ economic 
growth specifically in relation to job creation in areas 
of industrial decline and policy makers have begun to 
propose a transition towards green economies to 
address regional regeneration (see, for example, Name 
deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process; 
for discussion of the definition of Ǯregenerationǯ, see 
Roberts, 2000). These initiatives are designed to 
contribute to the promotion of sustained (green) 
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economic regeneration in areas once dependent on 
high-carbon industries, but transition in such places 
occurs differently region by region, and country by 
country.  A particular concern of this paper is the 
extent to which the (sustainable and green) transition 
and regeneration of formerly coal dependent regions 
is underscored by the creation of decent jobs. We 
explore the ways institutional frameworks at different 
levels and in different places cultivate (or notȌ Ǯdecentǯ 
jobs (in the creation of new Ǯgreenǯ jobs), as part of Ǯgreenǯ transition and regeneration strategies.   
 
While steps may be taken to move to low carbon 
production, they are usually part of broader economic 
and social shifts to develop a green economy. Such an 
economy, in our view, is one Ǯthat results in improved 
human well-being and social equity, whilst 
significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcitiesǯ ȋUNEP, ʹͲͳͳ: ͳ͸Ȍ. In this respect, 
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the focus is broader than the development of a low 
carbon economy focused singularly on minimising 
carbon emissions per unit of output (Levy, 2010).  By 
focusing on the Ǯsocial justiceǯ emphasis ȋUNEP, ʹͲͳͳȌ 
attention is drawn to the creation of Ǯdecentǯ jobs in 
such transitions, a factor that is sometimes 
underplayed in current debate. Such jobs are 
remunerated with relatively adequate wages, safe 
working conditions, job security, skilled and satisfying 
work, and worker voice (UNEP, 2011) – although 
Yates and Leach (2006: 366) discuss the limitations of 
work defined as Ǯgoodǯ (or bad or otherwise) when the 
underlying capitalist nature of the social relations at 
work remain obscured.  
 This paperǯs analysis is focused on a consideration of 
transition in advanced capitalist societies, and works 
toward developing a political economy of regeneration 
and regional transition. The context for this analysis is 
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a cross-national comparison of two old coal dependent 
industrial regions: the Ruhr, Germany and the South 
Wales Valleys, UK. Arguments for regeneration and 
transition often involve claims about the quality and 
quantity of jobs that may result (UNEP, 2011). 
Estimates vary on the latter, and some suggest that net 
job losses might ensue (see Bowen, 2012). Indeed, it 
may be that at the heart of such policies there is a 
contradiction between developing sustainable jobs for 
a sustainable economy and maintaining current job 
levels; these moves may require lower levels of 
production and a dampening of demand for some 
commodities.  Of course, in the face of mass 
unemployment, some might argue that for those 
without waged work, particularly the unskilled, 
policies aimed at job creation of any kind is in the 
interests of workers as waged employees (see Bowen, 
2012). Such perspectives are reinforced by the 
difficulties often associated with attracting sustained 
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investment to these places (e.g. Wang and Eames, 
2010).  
 
Certainly, the transition to a green economy will 
necessarily involve changes in employment and skills. 
As new occupational profiles and Ǯwork… that 
contributes to preserving or restoring the quality of the environmentǯ (UNEP, 2011: 5) or Ǯgreen jobsǯ 
emerge, other occupations, jobs and skills may become 
obsolete (Fankhauser et al. 2008). Our claim is that in 
this process of transition, the creation of decent jobs – 
as defined above (UNEP, 2011) – should be central, whether the Ǯjobǯ is specifically Ǯgreenǯ or not. 
Employment related to the extraction of coal is often 
associated with relatively high levels of remuneration 
and strong levels of worker representation, as well as 
particular skill-sets; some of the markers of decent 
work, despite the evident health hazards of these 
particular jobs. However, the prospects of transition to 
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comparable Ǯdecentǯ jobs in the context of social change may be limited by an evident Ǯskills lock-inǯ, 
and the sometimes poor dispositions towards (formal) 
education and training that exists in these mono-
industrial regions (Name deleted to maintain the 
integrity of the review process). Hence, an all-too-
common feature of regeneration strategies is that they 
rely on low-skilled, low-paid and transitory work (see 
Pickernell, 2011), whereas the generation of skills and 
skilled employment is often viewed as integral to the 
creation of decent jobs (and thus central to the 
interests of labour). Indeed, the development of 
appropriate skills has been identified as a crucial 
element in green transition (Jagger et al., 2012) 
although it is an under-researched factor in relation to 
the facilitation (or constraint) of transition.  
 
The first analytic point to note is the importance of 
understanding worker needs and aspirations in the 
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context of transition, as well as the salience of specific 
political-economic contexts in which skills and job 
creation are embedded. We thus begin by initially 
situating our understandings of processes of transition and regeneration within (all and Soskiceǯs ȋʹͲͲͳȌ 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) model, thereby extending 
its application – it is our starting point to understand 
the processes of regional transition in modern 
capitalist economies (cf. Cooke, 2010; Couch et al, ʹͲͳͳȌ. (all and Soskiceǯs ȋʹͲͲͳȌ framework identifies 
variations in the institutional patterns of different 
capitalist systems, distinguishing between Liberal 
Market Economies (LMEs) and Coordinated Market 
Economies (CMEs). As an archetypal CME, the Ruhr 
region of Germany provides an appropriate contrast 
with the UK, often viewed as an LME (cf. Cooke, 2010). 
But, decisively, the task is to extend the argument to 
include a consideration of state and regional 
governance as key factors in the promotion of 
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transition (the first stage of the analysis is developed 
in Name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review 
process).  
  
Although subject to much debate (e.g. Crouch, 2005), 
the CME/LME distinction provides a means of 
identifying the necessary conditions for transition – as 
an explanation of the differences in economic and 
political institutions responsible for specific kinds of 
society and, in this respect, an account of the 
underlying factors that shape processes of transition 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001).  Complementary to this 
analysis is an examination of patterns of urban 
governance, and an assessment of the interaction of 
state and regional political institutions and societal 
partners in the delivery of economic development. Our 
analysis is thus concerned with the way that regions 
are embedded within state-centric models of institutional control, as well as subject to Ǯextensive 
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networks of local state/regional governanceǯ, which 
shape decision-making capacities for (green) 
economic development in important ways and play a 
critical role in the positioning of labour (and other 
social actors) in regeneration/transition efforts 
(Pierre, 2014, p.3; more specifically, on coal regions 
and regeneration, see Gore et al. 2007. See also 
Engstrand and Stam (2002) on the embeddedness of 
institutional structures to enable or constrain 
economic transition and transformation in 
manufacturing regions).  
 
More specifically, we assess the ways in which the shift 
to low carbon production (and ultimately, a green 
economy) involves transformation of the existing 
socio-technical regimes, to overcome path-dependent Ǯlock-inǯ ȋ(assink, ʹͲͳͲȌ.  )t thus becomes necessary to 
examine particular sets of institutions (e.g. Vocational 
Education and Training systems), as well as (local) 
10 
 
governance structures involved in regeneration and 
transition, which rely on the existence of social capital 
for their efficacy. The outcome is a comparative 
assessment – in terms of the potential for decent jobs 
creation – of regeneration and green economy 
transition politics and policies in two former coal 
regions. 
 
The Research 
 
Many governments have developed policies aimed at 
stimulating the transition of declining industrial 
regions, and increasingly, green economic activity 
forms the core aspect of regeneration strategies (see 
Name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review 
process for a review). The primary data for this 
analysis comprises national government policies, 
regional government and development policies, public 
reports and other primary source data, such as 
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commentaries and announcements about such policies 
and their objectives. In addition, expert research 
commentary was sought where appropriate (for full 
details and the research context, see Name deleted to 
maintain the integrity of the review process).   
 
The cross-national/regional basis of the study allows 
for the comparison of similar policy objectives within 
the distinct (and thus limited) institutional contexts of 
the Ruhr, Germany and South Wales Valleys, UK. Our 
analysis is distinctive in that  it offers an account of the 
way different regions with similar industrial histories 
might transition from unsustainable pasts to sustainable ȋi.e. Ǯgreenǯ and socially justȌ futures. The 
purpose is to illuminate the distinctive ways in which 
transition policies are elaborated and implemented in 
former coal regions. Specifically, in presenting our 
data, the aim is to identify and analyse the core 
features of regeneration in these two regions, and 
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within the specific context of green transition, explore 
the capacity for the creation of decent jobs in capitalist 
societies, characterised by liberal democratic regimes 
of differing institutional forms.   
 
From short-term policies to long-term strategies  
 
The Ruhr and South Wales Valleys regions have both 
experienced the decline of their coal industries 
followed by a range of regeneration policies. More 
recently, such policies (as well as wider industrial and 
economic development strategies) have been located 
within green transition frameworks. To understand 
these processes, we provide a brief outline and history of each case, before detailing a number of Ǯgreenǯ ȋand otherȌ efforts to Ǯregenerateǯ each regionǯs economy. 
We begin with the Ruhr region before turning to the 
Valleys. The accounts provided are not exhaustive of 
regeneration efforts within each region, but are aimed 
13 
 
at identifying some of the core policies and approaches 
that underscore efforts towards regeneration and 
green transition.  
 
The Ruhr region 
 
The Ruhr region forms part of the North Rhine 
Westphalia (NRW) Länder, currently governed by a 
Social Democrat/Green coalition. The Ruhr is an extensive, polycentric urban area, one of EuropeǮs 
most densely populated conurbations with 
approximately 5.3 million inhabitants. It was once the 
largest industrial site in Europe, with coal constituting 
a major source of employment. Since the 1960s, 
however, the area has experienced industrial decline 
and rising unemployment – the figure stood at 11% in 
December 2013 compared with the NRW figure of 
8.4%, and the national average of 5.1% (EURES, 2013). 
Coal mining retains a presence, with seven hard-coal 
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mines, employing some 35,000 workers, still 
operational in the Ruhr (Jung et al, 2010).  The 
(unprofitable) mining industry is currently subsidised 
by the German government by up to €͵.ͷ billion 
annually, with financial support assured until the last 
mine closes in 2018. This phase-out was agreed with 
the mining union, IG Bergbau, with the stated objective 
of job preservation, reflecting the role of labour as a 
stakeholder in this context.  
 
It is estimated that the phase-out of subsidies could 
lead to a rise in unemployment by two percentage 
points (Block, 2011). Current policies are therefore 
important indicators of how well the region is set to 
deal with the further demise of mining employment. 
The timeframe involved has allowed for longer-term 
planning for regeneration and the creation of 
replacement jobs (Block, 2011).  Longer-term 
regeneration strategies began in the 1980s when 
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unemployment peaked at 17%. The regional 
government attempted to attract investment from 
knowledge-based firms, expand the service sector, and 
promote local entrepreneurship. Moreover, it 
promoted regeneration based on ecological and 
sustainability concerns (Trettin et al, 2010).   
 
Of note, the level of technological innovation of 
German mining companies in the Ruhr means that 
where they once produced mining technology, they are 
now leading producers of wind turbine parts, biomass 
generators and drilling machinery for geothermal 
energy.  The RuhrKohle AG (RAG) is transforming its 
mines into sources of renewable energy, with 
conversion of one former mine into a biomass centre 
and the conversion of other underground mines into 
pump-storage hydro-electric facilities for storing 
excess renewable power. RAG has also founded a solar 
farm development company with the expectation that 
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these developments will create jobs for many of the 
24,000 miners employed by the company (Dohmen 
and Schmid, 2011).  
 
Regional government – with federal and European 
Union (EU) funding – has been central in shaping these regeneration strategies, acting in Ǯcorporatistǯ 
partnership with municipalities and private actors. 
The creation of the IBA Emscher Science Park, 
established in 1988, is one such example, developed as 
part of a public-private partnership to revitalise 
brownfield sites in the Emscher Valley (Trettin et al, 
2010).   The NRW government established the IBA 
planning company, which initiated 120 projects.  
However, the actual instigation of the initiative was by 
local networks of municipal authority representatives, 
business associations, trade unions, environmental 
actors, planning and architecture experts – rather than 
state-centric. These actors were wholly responsible for 
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these projects and, as will be explored in more detail 
later, this suggests something of a Ǯgovernance without governmentǯ and Ǯgovernance by networksǯ thesis 
(Ward, 2009).  The Emscher Park projects created an 
estimated 5000 new jobs, employing significant 
numbers of former miners in green retrofit and 
ecological restoration (Block, 2011). 
 
This long-term, developmental perspective is further 
exemplified by the regeneration of the city of Gelsenkirchen into a Ǯsolar cityǯ, which was, until 
recently, the largest supplier of solar energy in Europe.  
Regeneration focused on the creation of renewable 
energy sources and energy efficiency improvements, 
so as to diversify the industrial base, provide new 
employment and enhance the environment. This 
began with the construction of a science 
park/technology centre. Alongside clean energy 
research institutes, a number of cell and module 
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photovoltaic (PV) production facilities have been 
established. Regional companies increasingly began to 
engage in the planning, installation, maintenance and 
marketing of solar technologies, cultivating a ´solar 
service sector´ and jobs across the supply chain, 
although some estimate that the industry may only 
create 1000 new jobs within the next ten years 
(Schmitz-Borchert, 2011). Nonetheless, renewable 
energy R&D has become an important activity in the 
Science Park, thus the sector is high value-added, 
knowledge-intensive, highly-skilled and in this respect 
constitutes Ǯdecent workǯ. By ʹͲͳͲ, the portfolio of companies in Gelsenkirchenǯs clean energy cluster 
extended beyond the PV sector and included 
production facilities for solar thermal collectors, 
ground-based heat pumps, cogeneration units and 
components of wind power stations, as well as 
engineering companies focusing on biogas and wind 
energy (Jung et al, 2010).   
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Furthermore, since the 1970s, resources have been directed at developing the regional Ǯskill infrastructureǯ, opening universities and encouraging 
R&D investment. Regular training programmes for 
architects, project developers, workers and 
unemployed people (including training programmes 
for former miners) have been initiated and hosted by 
the Science Park (Schmitz-Borchert, 2011).  The 
German tradition of a strong dual VET system also 
means that the workforce is relatively well placed to 
make the transition to a sustainable economy, with 
environmental issues integrated into all VET 
regulations in the system (CEDEFOP, 2010). The range 
of specific VET courses related to environmental 
protection is also substantial (e.g. Name deleted to 
maintain the integrity of the review process). 
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Unemployment remains a problem and it is unlikely that Ǯgreenǯ jobs will replace all the jobs lost from coal 
across the region, with many such jobs created too 
long after displacement occurred (Block, 2011). The 
German solar sector has moreover, recently been 
besieged with problems, as the global sector 
consolidates (Hawley, 2013). However, the presence of 
other clean energy manufacturing in the region (e.g. 
wind equipment) is more positive, with net 
employment expected to rise steadily (Luhr et al., 
2011).   Over 3,000 renewable energy firms, 
employing around 19,000 workers are currently 
located in NRW and a third of these firms are based in 
the Ruhr (Block, 2011). It is estimated that a thousand 
domestic wind equipment manufacturers supplied over ͹͹% of the German domestic market ȋthe worldǯs 
fifth largest) in 2009, and they have also benefited 
from growing international renewables markets – as 
much as 80% of German-made wind power equipment 
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is exported. Thus, whilst displaced workers have not 
always benefitted from regeneration/transition 
strategies, the area is developing the foundations for a Ǯgreenǯ transition based on a knowledge-intensive, 
high skill trajectory, encouraged by effective and 
robust VET systems, environmental regulation and 
wider government policy.   
 
The South Wales Valleys 
 
The South Wales Valleys is one of the poorest regions 
in the UK, with a Gross Value Added per capita 
standing at 75% of the UK average (Hunt, 2011). The 
region has experienced significant deindustrialisation, 
as its core industries of coal mining and steel 
production have declined, with subsequent 
regeneration initiatives failing to provide sustained 
employment (Pickernell, 2011). In the 1970s, the main 
strategy for dealing with job displacement from 
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primary industry was relatively generous redundancy 
payments, providing older miners with early 
retirement and supposedly facilitating the 
retraining/re-employment of younger workers. 
However, new employment opportunities proved 
scarce (Parry, 2003). In December 2013, the 
unemployment rate across the Valleys was 
approximately 12% (rising to 18% in some 
constituencies), compared to the 7.5% UK national 
average (StatsWales, 2014).  
 
The first long-term regeneration strategy was the Conservative governmentǯs ǮProgramme for the Valleysǯ, introduced in ͳͻͺͺ.  A principal plank of the 
programme was the creation of manufacturing 
employment opportunities through Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI).  Via subsidies and exemptions for 
private companies, FDI was encouraged. Indeed, up 
until the late 1990s, there was an exclusive focus on 
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attracting FDI for regeneration, rather than the 
cultivation of indigenous entrepreneurship, local 
business and SMEs (Brooksbank and Pickernell, 2001). 
However, whilst the region proved extremely adept at 
attracting such investment, the FDI displayed a Ǯbranch office syndromeǯ, where factories focused on 
the assembly of low-value, mature products rather 
than high value-added, R&D intensive activity (Hunt, 
2011). This approach perpetuated the high numbers of 
low-skill machine operators in the Valleys area, reinforcing the Ǯlow pay-low skillǯ equilibrium 
characteristic of much of UK manufacturing 
(Pickernell, 2011). Many of these jobs proved insecure, 
with significant numbers of these relatively mobile 
firms leaving after a short time – with an estimated 
31,000 jobs lost (Evans et al, 2008). The Valleysǯ 
subsequent designation as a European Union Objective 
One region, and thus a recipient of various funds to 
address social-dislocation and stimulate growth 
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highlighted the failure of the strategy – the region continues to qualify for Ǯstructural fundsǯ to this day.   
 
Following the election of New Labour in 1997, the 
transition strategy focused on joint central, regional 
and local approaches, with much rhetoric about the 
value of community empowerment and citizen 
participation (Doering, 2013).  One related outcome 
was a process of devolution, establishing the Welsh 
Government in 1999.  From the outset, the Welsh 
Government stated its policy objective of stimulating 
economic development (Welsh Assembly Government, 
2005). In conjunction with Objective One funding, the government promoted its ǮCommunities Firstǯ 
programme, a revised regeneration approach.  Its 
principal aim was job creation with a focus on the 
cultivation of small local enterprises. However, the 
absence of the necessary skills and social 
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infrastructure undermined the programmeǯs aims 
(Pike et al, 2006).   
 
The programme remains, nonetheless, part of the 
Welsh Governmentǯs Ǯtoolkitǯ; and, as of March ʹͲͳ͵, 
has been subsumed under the ǮVibrant and Viable Placesǯ regeneration framework. Aimed at establishing  
strong local economies, this framework adopts a 
targeted approach to investment, extending out the 
Communities First partnership model and linking it 
with broader economic development strategies across 
Wales; principally the Wales Infrastructure 
Investment Plan (WIIP) for Jobs and Growth. Within 
the WIIP there is an explicitly defined vision of moving 
towards a low carbon economy, which connects with 
distinctive Welsh Government strategies on skills 
generation. An additional ǮGreen Growth Walesǯ 
investment strategy brings together the Welsh 
Government with the networking organisation Sustain 
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Wales (Cynnal Cymru) to promote investment in Ǯgreen growthǯ across Wales; a strategy that is based on promoting Walesǯ natural resources, as well as 
developing its infrastructure and encouraging 
collaboration and partnership. 
 
The Welsh Government has focused heavily on skills 
development.  The ǮSkills that Work for Walesǯ (Welsh 
Assembly Government, 2008) strategy document, for 
example, emphasises skills development for sustainable jobs ȋnot necessarily Ǯgreenǯ jobsȌ and the 
more recent Skills Policy Statement (Welsh 
Government, 2014) refocuses Welsh Government 
investment priorities with regard to skills at a time of 
austerity and scare resources. Nonetheless, across 
both documents, the Welsh Government recognises 
the need to target funds, prioritise higher-level skills 
(as well as literacy and numeracy) and ensure closer 
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links between skills demand/employer needs and 
supply.  
 
The more recent, policy statement on skills specifically 
identifies the need for developments to support high 
quality and higher paid jobs, and in doing so links 
closely with the aims of the WIIP (Welsh Government, 
2014). Elements of partnership on these goals are 
evident in the Wales Employment and Skills Board 
(WESB), which comprises employer members, training 
providers, trade unions and economic development 
experts. Further, as part of its Sustainable 
Development Scheme, the Welsh Government declares 
that its skills investment will continue to focus on 
ensuring the right training is available to help deliver a 
low-carbon transition in Wales, supporting 
opportunities for skills development and job creation 
within the emerging green economy (Welsh 
Government, 2012). However, despite Welsh 
28 
 
Government efforts to develop collaborative rather 
than a competition-based (as is in England) skills/VET 
systems, a reliance on Ǯvoluntaristǯ and market-based 
training systems means that systematic disincentives 
for employers to develop their workforce persist (see 
Bosch and Charest, 2008 on LME and CME approaches 
to VET; and Keep (2008) and Payne (2009) for 
discussions of different approaches to skills policy in 
different parts of the UK). 
 
The Welsh Government has a statutory duty to 
promote sustainable development within its 
constitution and appears determined to play an 
internationally leading role in tackling climate change 
(Wang and Eames, 2010). It has established ambitious 
targets and, unlike national UK policy, the Welsh policy 
discourse places climate change very much in the 
context of sustainable development (cf. Scott-Cato, ʹͲͲ͹Ȍ. )t is moreover, said to Ǯhave made good 
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progress towards reducing carbon emissions and preparing for climate changeǯ ȋUK Committee on 
Climate Change, 2012). Indeed, the Welsh Government has published a dedicated Ǯgreen jobsǯ strategy ȋWelsh 
Assembly Government, 2009), therein recognising the 
role of such a transition in economic development and 
the necessity of targeted skills provision. 
Characteristic of its current approach, the Welsh 
Government announced a £75 million scheme to 
create 12,000 jobs with one of three specific streams 
of support targeting green jobs (Welsh Government, 
2012).  
 
Further, a £30 million scheme (Arbed) was created in ʹͲͳͲ with the aim of Ǯgreeningǯ the existing housing 
stock in the most deprived areas of Wales, which 
constitutes a regeneration strategy through the 
development of Ǯgreenǯ jobs and skills ȋWelsh 
Government, 2011).  In addition, a British Gas Green 
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Skills Training Centre opened in 2010, with a target to 
train 1000 people each year. The first of its kind in the 
UK, this public-private partnership offers accredited 
training for energy efficiency assessment and green 
technology installation. It is too soon to gauge the extent to which these Ǯgreenǯ schemes will contribute to Ǯregeneratingǯ former coal areas and promote the 
transition to a green economy.  However, it is clear 
that deep-seated economic and social problems 
persist. Unemployment and economic inactivity 
remain high in the Valleys region, a situation 
exacerbated by the recent recession. There is 
moreover, little evidence that sufficient 
(decent/sustainable) jobs are being created and the 
roots of education and skills deficits in the Valleys 
region continue to constrain opportunities, thereby 
reproducing patterns of inequality and disadvantage 
(WTUC, n.d.).  
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From regeneration to transition  
 
Forms of political and institutional governance shape 
policy and decision-making processes, and the ways in 
which social actors engage in such processes. Within 
the LME context of the UK, state policy and regulation 
ensure that market forces prevail, encouraging the 
formation of short-term, low trust, competitive 
relations between economic actors (Hall and Soskice, 
2001).  Accordingly, such institutional contexts are 
inimical to the cultivation of longer-term, collaborative 
orientations, resulting in chronic capital under-
investment (Lee, 1996). Typically, there is a lack of 
parity for labour as a stakeholder; both reflected in 
and perpetuated by low levels of employment protection, weak forms of institutional Ǯvoiceǯ and Ǯvoluntaristǯ market-based training systems (Godard, 
2004). Here, VET systems are low-status, with 
typically poor quality of provision and outcomes, 
32 
 
contributing to high numbers of low skilled workers in 
the labour market (Bosch and Charest, 2008).  These parameters constrained the ǮProgramme for the 
Valleysǯ and more recent community-based initiatives 
have been similarly undermined (see Gore et al. 2007), 
as has the potential for economic growth more 
generally, including with regard to Ǯgreenǯ growth. 
 
Indeed, one possible assessment is that there is a 
limited engagement with the green agenda within the UK because the prevailing view is that Ǯgreenǯ issues 
are an unnecessary restriction on business. Certainly, 
there is a limited vision and investment in the 
technology and skills necessary for green transitions 
(e.g. Macalister, 2010).  Wider environmental policies 
have, moreover, increasingly been attacked and the UK 
has the largest green skills deficit of comparator EU 
states (IES 2012). The Renewable Energy Association 
(2012) identified the lack of appropriately skilled 
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labour as a significant problem for any green 
transition. Further, whilst the UK has a strong 
legislative basis for climate action, coupled with 
ambitious targets, it lags behind other Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries in government energy R&D spending, with 
such expenditure declining substantially over the past 
twenty years (Bowen and Rydge, 2011). This approach 
goes against an effective policy grain, where business 
investment in green R&D/innovation depends on well-
designed, consistent public policies that provide long-term credibility ȋe.g. (aščič, ʹͲͳʹȌ.   
 
The contrast with the CME context of the Ruhr region 
is stark. Within such arrangements, markets are Ǯdeeply embedded in an array of co-operative, redistributive and regulatory institutionsǯ ȋStreeck, 
1992: 6). These include business/employer 
associations, trade unions, cross-shareholding 
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networks, as well as regulatory systems that 
encourage collaboration and interdependency (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). The German political system is 
typified by power sharing, with institutions correlated 
with high levels of associational activity and social 
capital.  Indeed, the German process of setting environmental policy is strongly democratic ȋ(aščič, 
2012).  Environmental protection has been at the 
centre of public policy for decades and is a reflection of 
the strong environmental movement, the political 
success of German Green Party and the subsequent 
integration of environmental issues by other political 
parties (Blühdorn, 2009). Thus, a principle focus for 
the German government is, for example, renewable 
energy, with it set to account for 60% of gross final 
energy consumption in 2050, alongside the phasing 
out of nuclear power plants by 2022 (Lehr et al. 2011). 
The driving force for Green Party success is the electorateǯs wider concern with the environment and 
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opposition to nuclear energy (Rudig, 2012), but 
environmental policies have long been perceived by 
government and industry as a mechanism to develop 
market opportunities for domestic firms, to encourage innovation ȋ(aščič, ʹͲͳʹȌ.   
 Germanyǯs institutional context, with its longer-term 
orientation, fosters capital investment. Specifically, 
Germany has the strongest record on green innovation 
in Europe (Fankhauser et al, 2012).  Innovation is 
supported by high-quality German VET programmes, 
centred on industry-specific engineering/technical 
skills. The system is highly responsive to industrial 
innovations and changing employer demands (Bosch 
and Charest 2008).  Robust frameworks for 
incorporating changes in industry/occupational skills 
needs into training responses exist, namely the 
institutions that support sectoral dialogue between 
social partners.  Through such mechanisms, the 
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occupational competences and the training 
regulations/curricula that accompany them have been Ǯgreenedǯ, despite a lack of an overarching state-driven 
green skills policy (Name deleted to maintain the 
integrity of the review process).  This process of organic 
collaboration stands in sharp contrast to top-down 
efforts to drive such agenda in the UK.  
 )n both regions, there is an aspect of Ǯgreeningǯ the 
economy by default. Coal extraction (and all that it 
implies environmentally) no longer occurs or, in the 
case of the Ruhr, has been vastly diminished prior to 
phase-out. Further, improvement of the physical 
environment may also take place. Such outcomes are 
more or less unintended and can become part of the 
post facto rationale for claiming benefits from 
deindustrialisation. Hence, we suggest the reasoning 
for transition to a green economy lies elsewhere.  
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First, the transition to a Ǯnewǯ economy based on the promotion of low carbon economic activity and Ǯgreenǯ 
industries requires policies aimed at a comprehensive 
restructuring of the regional economic landscape. 
These two case studies indicate, to varying degrees, that Ǯgreenǯ activity can become a specific part of 
economic development and regeneration strategies. A 
number of policies implemented within the NRW and 
Valleys regions (as well as Wales, more generally) are 
evidence of governance efforts to transition toward a Ǯsustainable, low-carbon economyǯ. More particularly, 
both have sought to engage Ǯlocalǯ stakeholders, as well 
as look more widely for investment and partnership, 
to drive development. However, of central importance 
is the wider political economy and institutional 
frameworks that shape and inform the direction of 
these policies. Clearly, the patterns of transition are 
uneven and varied across the two cases. The 
prevailing institutional arrangements mean that 
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(nations and) regions evolve along particular path-
dependent trajectories, locked into specific patterns of 
development (Couch et al., 2011).  
 
Within the explicitly CME context of NRW, the decline 
of the mining sector within the region has been 
managed across several decades in ways that 
preserved jobs. Additionally, the gradual phasing out 
of mining subsidies provided time for the 
diversification of activities to create new (green) 
employment opportunities. This approach stands in 
sharp contrast to Britainǯs rapid and brutal pit closure 
programme of the 1980s, illustrated by the Valleys 
case, where there was little planning or provision for 
alternative employment and economic development 
(Bennett et al., 2000). Despite such differences, in both 
cases past regeneration strategies have not always 
produced the desired effects in re-locating displaced 
workers. However, within the LME context, in 
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particular, there has been a failure to generate high-
skill, sustainable employment opportunities, with 
more success evident in the CME context.   
 
The institutional configuration found in the CME 
context of Germany has been more conducive to 
overcoming – at least partially – Ǯlock-inǯ to existing 
high-carbon socio-technical regimes (Unruh, 2000), stimulating an early focus on Ǯgreenǯ economic activity 
as a means of regeneration.  Growing demand for low-
carbon activities is manifested in different forms of 
economic activity, with one scenario being export-
oriented, manufacturing-led growth. Germany is a leader in this approach, with Ǯfirst moverǯ advantages 
in the global market (e.g. Levy, 2010).  The outputs 
from such a sector are highly tradable over distance, 
making for more sustainable activity.  Indeed, the 
longer-term orientation of German governments has 
facilitated the creation of a framework of 
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environmental regulation, long-term protection and 
sustainability, with climate change mitigation 
enshrined in legislation. This framework stimulated 
green economic activity in the Ruhr regeneration. The 
outcome has been a developmental perspective, 
credited with encouraging apposite investments in 
human capital and low-carbon technology, leading to 
an impressive record on innovation, particularly 
within engineering and manufacturing sectors (see 
Hall and Soskice, 2001).   
 
The strong base of engineering and technical skills 
already available in the German region, along with a 
responsive and high quality VET system that has been 
extensively greened has ensured that necessary re-
skilling could be undertaken (see Name deleted to 
maintain the integrity of the review process). The 
outcome is the cultivation of high value-added and 
knowledge-intensive green economic activity in the 
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region, with such competitive strategies, based on 
quality and innovation, associated with high-
performance work systems, investment-orientated 
human resource practices and thus the creation of Ǯdecentǯ jobs. While Ǯgreen jobsǯ are not synonymous 
with decent work, the institutional supports within the 
German context mean that there is a higher probability that new jobs created will constitute Ǯdecentǯ work; it 
is more likely that jobs in such contexts are designed 
in such a way so as to utilise available high skills, 
thereby encouraging worker autonomy and involvement and a higher likelihood of Ǯmutual gainsǯ 
materialising.  
  Conversely, the Valleys region is Ǯlocked-inǯ to a low-
skill, low pay trajectory. The Ǯbranch plant syndromeǯ 
of FDI is both a reflection and a reinforcement of this 
condition, which the more recent Communities First 
programme struggles to tackle. At present, the 
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necessary infrastructures – as well as social and 
political support – is lacking to facilitate a capital-
intensive, high-skill trajectory, leading to the creation 
of decent jobs (Meadway, 2013). Moreover, the two 
flagship Welsh Government initiatives discussed were 
aimed at construction/building retrofit, and thus are 
representative of a low-carbon technology 
implementation activity (Levy, 2010). The focus is on 
installation, implying import of higher value-added 
and skilled inputs, with little scope for generating 
substantial export revenues.  Retrofit 
construction/maintenance activities are labour-
intensive with substantial potential for employment 
creation; however, and of significance, any jobs 
created will be based on manual labour with relatively 
low-skill requirements and predominantly precarious, 
utilising short-term contracts (Levy, 2010).  This Ǯlow roadǯ approach to employment and job design stands 
in contrast to the Ruhr, where green/low carbon 
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technologies are being researched, developed and 
manufactured, with a significant proportion of this 
output exported.  
 The UKǯs technical skills deficit has been identified as a 
principal barrier to developing low-carbon 
manufacturing-led growth (e.g. Levy, 2010). Further, 
this factor also highlights the inherent problems of Ǯemployer-ledǯ systems of VET ȋName deleted to 
maintain the integrity of the review process). Thus, the 
more rudimentary development of green economic 
activity in Wales is attributable in part to a wider 
green skills deficiency.  There is some evidence that 
employer demand for green skills is increasing more 
generally (HM Government, 2011), but this state of 
affairs is threatened by uneven approaches by 
(Westminster) government to environmental/climate 
change policy. If government policy is complex and 
inconsistent – accusations that have been levelled at 
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UK policy (e.g. Bowen and Rydge, 2011) – employers 
will mistrust the long-term validity of the plan, hedge 
their behaviour and fail to make necessary 
investments in both technology and skills (Jagger et al., 
2012).  A vicious circle is created, where a lack of skills 
itself is a cause of policy or market uncertainty, which 
in turn further deters skills provision (Foxon, 2011).   
 
The premise here is that effective regeneration and 
transition policies only emerge where a co-productive 
partnership is developed between the state qua 
government and the social groups that comprise the 
region, including employers, workers and their 
representatives (Beer and Clower, 2013). Indeed, the 
two cases demonstrate the extent to which different 
interests are represented in policy development and 
outcomes. Central governments in both cases stressed 
forms of governance that emphasise the importance of 
partnerships at the regional level.  However, with the 
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pervasiveness of the neoliberal approach to 
governance, underwriting the primacy of the 
economic, has become more apparent in policy focus, 
leading to regional policy and regulation which 
primarily gives voice to business interests (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002; Beer et al, 2005).  Thus, business leaders 
and related members of the local political elites are the 
lead players in such developments.   
 
The implication of the assessment in terms of regional 
political and business elite dominance is that other 
social actors are marginalised, such as labour, 
including trade unions, community groups and the 
educational and social security sections of 
government. To illustrate the conundrum, where such 
regeneration measures involve the creation of 
networks of partners, it does not necessarily mean 
that labour and its associations will find a place at the 
policy table.  Clearly, in CME contexts, labour is often 
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viewed as a legitimate stakeholder with accompanying 
institutional arrangements (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
However, the involvement of trade unions and related 
organisations as the voice of labour is less evident 
within LMEs, arguably leading to a lack of emphasis as 
to the need for decent work (Godard, 2004).  Of 
course, even within such contexts, the porosity of 
relations in capitalist societies mean regeneration 
strategies can involve more inclusive forms of 
governance based on partnership working, illustrated 
by some of the emergent institutions in the Welsh case 
(e.g. WESB), but trade union involvement tends to be 
notional and tokenistic. 
  
Three analytic points can now be made, thereby 
extending a political economy approach to the study of 
regeneration and regional transition. First, effective 
policy initiatives depend upon approaches to 
governance. Of course, even where there are clear 
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efforts in this direction, unless policy is Ǯjoined-upǯ it risks the Ǯgreenǯ credentials of the region ȋon joined 
up-governance, see, for example, OǯFlynn et al., 2011). 
For example, where the use of coal remains part of 
energy policy – as in Germany – and, moreover, where 
patterns of consumption remain unchanged, questions 
might be raised about the extent to which regions can properly be defined as Ǯgreenǯ or Ǯlow-carbonǯ. )ndeed, 
it is improbable that the geographic distribution of 
green activities will map neatly onto existing patterns 
of economic activity (in coal regions). On the contrary, 
green activities are, in fact, much more likely to be 
distributed unevenly throughout economies. 
 
Second, networks based on trust, subject to rules 
negotiated by network participants and characterised 
by a significant degree of autonomy from central 
government –Ǯgovernance without governmentǯ ȋsee 
Rhodes, 1996) – were more evident in the German 
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case.  Such networks are facilitated by high levels of 
social capital and broader stakeholder perspectives, 
and institutionalised through corporatist-type 
arrangements and embedded forms of social 
partnership.  However, Grabher (1993: 24) suggests 
the embeddedness of actors and inter-firm networks 
(a consequence of the shape and form of social capital 
in the region) may stymie innovation, and this helps 
describe the decline of the Ruhr area. Indeed, 
Engstrand and Stam (2002) find that some 
manufacturing sectors (e.g. shipyards) with strong 
unions and political Ǯlock-inǯ at the level of the locality 
(similar to the coal industry) can constrain the 
economic development of the region (p.383). 
 
However, we suggest that the close working 
relationships in relation to the governance of the Ruhr 
region appear to have helped facilitate innovation and a shift towards a Ǯgreenǯ transition. This is innovation 
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that is facilitated by institutional structures and the 
politics of the region, which unlocks the potential for 
renewable energy and is serviced by developing the 
existing skills-base (cf. Engstrand and Stam, 2002). 
The pioneering examples at Emscher and 
Gelsenkirchen illustrate how a process that centres on 
labour – and, indeed, involves labour organisations – 
can expedite critical initial steps towards transition. 
Moreover, and crucially for our analysis, decent jobs 
are more likely to ensue from such initiatives. Trade 
unions have emerged as powerful forces in German 
urban politics and regeneration activity (DiGaetano 
and Strom, 2003). Despite a more hostile climate to 
corporatist decision-making in recent years (between 
social partners and with regard to inter-union 
competition), wider evidence points to continued 
trade union influence (Burgess and Symon, 2012; 
Greer and Turner, 2009; Hassel, 2012).     
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In contrast, within the UK, the importance of Ǯpartnershipǯ in urban renewal from the mid-90s 
onwards is largely rhetorical.  Partnership working 
was seemingly indicative of growing governmental 
recognition of the importance of social capital and the 
application of US-style urban policies, involving Ǯgovernance by networksǯ and its engagement of public 
sector officials and private economic elites (Davies, 
2002).   However, despite the heavy discursive 
emphasis on the importance of decentralisation and 
community-led partnerships for successful 
regeneration, not only did central government retain a Ǯtight gripǯ on funds, there was a marked tendency for 
regional institutions to exercise power and create Ǯvertical networksǯ to the detriment of horizontal 
networks (Bennett et al., 2000).  The reality was one of 
increased political centralisation, with central 
government attempting to purchase added leverage 
51 
 
over a range of local Ǯstakeholdersǯ via partnerships 
(Davies, 2002).  
 
Third, in all liberal democratic capitalist societies, 
government approaches steer their way through 
pressures toward partnership (coordination) and 
market based initiatives. The Welsh Government, for 
example, has a statutory duty to consult with 
representatives of business and other organisations, 
such as trade unions, where the exercise of the Welsh 
Government's functions impacts on their interests. 
This is embedded through the statutory Council for 
Economic Renewal. In contrast however, the 
partnership boards of the Communities First 
Programme have seldom involved union input (e.g. 
Adamson, 2010; see Pike et al, 2006). The situation in 
Wales reflects that in other parts of the UK. In England, 
for example, the Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) 
aim to foster  collaboration between business 
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representatives and local authority leaders, but have 
failed to effectively engage trade unions and other key 
social, economic and environmental stakeholders 
(TUC, 2013). 
 
There is however, some level of departure between 
the constituent parts of the UK and policies developed 
by the devolved administrations. In Wales, the 
devolved government has attempted to promote and 
formalise partnership arrangements at the level of the 
Principality, involving trade unions as the voice of 
workers, the WESB being one such example. But, on 
this development, whilst Wales is engaging in ways 
more consistent with CME practices in relation to 
institutional frameworks for skills and training, its EU 
partners would not necessarily be able to distinguish 
such distinctions between Wales and other parts of the 
UK. As with many of the neo-liberal institutions of the 
UK, it is unclear how the deeper cultivation of social 
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capital and partnership working will evolve in this 
hybridised case. There are moves towards institutionalising extant norms and practices of Ǯsocial solidarityǯ, an unusual trajectory for LMEs, and at 
variance with the generalised trend for increasing 
liberalisation and/or growing segmentation and 
duality within CMEs (see Thelen, 2009). Thus, we must 
be cautious about overstating the distinctiveness of 
either the LME or CME case; Germany and the United 
Kingdom illustrate variations in the capitalist relations 
that define both societies (Jessop, 2011). It remains to be seen whether this Ǯlayeringǯ ȋi.e. attaching new 
elements to existing institutions) will lead to any deep-
rooted transformation of regeneration processes and 
outcomes, particularly in terms of decent jobs and 
green transitions (see Streeck and Thelen, 2005). 
Capitalist societies and economies in general face this 
challenge.  
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Concluding remarks 
 
Transitions to low carbon economies are contested 
and uneven. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify 
three critical and interrelated conditions that facilitate 
such a shift in focus in established capitalist 
economies. First, the value of the typology associated 
with the varieties of capitalism analyses is that it 
allows a specification of the relationship between state 
and economy in terms of broader policy imperatives, 
with implications for regeneration and related 
transitions. German environmental policy has, for 
example, encouraged investment in green technology 
and renewable energy in particular in ways that are 
not evident within the UK.  
 
Second, the analysis demonstrates the centrality of Ǯgovernance without governmentǯ, with the proviso 
that these dimensions are not mutually exclusive.  The 
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high levels of social capital and broader stakeholder 
perspectives within the CME context underscores an 
industrial policy focused on the cultivation of high-end value added Ǯgreenǯ economic activity. In contrast, the 
Welsh case illustrates the ways in which a devolved 
government, pursuing social democratic policies can 
become influential in shifting the direction of policies 
associated with the regeneration, but in limited ways 
focused on narrow strategies of implementation. 
Overall, the national institutional framework in which Ǯgreenǯ and related transitional developments occur is crucial; a necessary condition of the Ǯpower toǯ 
promote and underwrite strategies at a regional level 
(see Pierre, 2014). 
 
Third, this analysis also draws attention to the political 
economy of economic organisation and operation that 
characterise capitalist states qua capitalist states. The 
cases each demonstrate the importance of skills and 
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training as centre pieces of the transition toward a 
green economy. Here, success depends on both the supply of and demand for Ǯgreenǯ jobs which are Ǯdecentǯ. This is a contested future and workers and 
their representatives are central to the achievement 
not only for transition to a green economy but one that 
also rests on decent jobs. 
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